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Unemployment Insurance and Subsequent Job Duration:
Job Matching vs Unobserved Heterogeneity*
Christian Belzil†
Résumé / Abstract
Dans cet article, j'analyse le lien entre la durée des prestations d'assurance-
chômage, la durée du chômage et la durée de l'emploi subséquent. L'analyse est
faite à l'aide d'un modèle de durée avec états multiples et hétérogénéité non-
observée. À l'aide du modèle, je tente de faire la distinction entre deux hypothèses
possibles qui expliqueraient la corrélation négative entre durée de chômage et
durée de l'emploi subséquent; la durée des prestations augmente la durée de
l'emploi subséquent (un effet de matching), ou la corrélation négative est
expliquée par la sélection adverse. Les résultats tendent à supporter l'hypothèse de
sélection adverse tandis que l'effet de matching semble être faible.
The relationship between Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit duration,
unemployment duration and subsequent job duration is investigated using a multi-
state duration model with state specific unobserved heterogeneity. I examine two
potential explanations for the negative correlation between unemployment and
job spell durations; UI benefits increase job matching quality (the "Matching"
effect) vs unobserved heterogeneity ("Adverse Selection"). The Matching effect is
found to be weak. Although new jobs accepted within 5 weeks of benefit
termination seem to have a higher dissolution rate, the negative correlation
between unemployment and job duration is mostly explained by unobserved
heterogeneity. Various simulations indicate that increasing the maximum benefit
duration by one week will raise expected unemployment duration by 1.0 to 1.5
days but will raise expected job duration by 0.5 to 0.8 days only.
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1 Introduction
The eect of Unemployment Insurance (UI) on the labor market is one of
the most active areas of research in modern labor economics. The payment
of UI benets increases the welfare of risk averse workers aected by adverse
employment shocks and raises their reservation wages. As a consequence, UI
is expected to raise the duration of unemployment. At the same time, the
payment of unemployment compensation can introduce strong disincentive
eects in the labor market. In particular, the payment of UI benets can
sometimes induce the unemployed to reduce their search intensity.
1
While the positive correlation between UI benet generosity and unem-
ployment duration is well established at the empirical level, whether it is
caused mostly by a decrease in search intensity or an increase in reservation
wages remain an open question.
2
The eect of UI on the labor market is
not limited to unemployment duration only. UI can also aect subsequent
job duration. Since benet generosity is expected to raise reservation wages
of the unemployed, it should therefore aect the quality of subsequent job
matches.
3
Although the eects of UI on unemployment duration is relatively
well documented, very little is known about the eects of UI on the quality
of labor market adjustments. This paper proposes an analysis of the eects
of UI benet duration from an angle which has, so far, been neglected in
the literature. The empirical analysis is based on the idea that UI benets
should not only aect the escape rate out of unemployment but also subse-
quent job duration. If increases in the escape rate out of unemployment are
explained by signicant decreases in reservation wages, those who are close
to benet termination might accept jobs which they are likely to quit in the
future. In other words, given a certain level of benet duration, those who
leave unemployment earlier (with a longer potential benet duration ahead)
1
For a theoretical analysis of moral hazard and Unemployment Insurance, see Hopen-
hayn and Nicolini (1997).
2
Meyer (1990) and Han and Hausman (1990) have found a signicant increase (spikes)
in the escape rate out of unemployment when unemployment benets lapse. This might
suggest that search intensity increases substantially shortly before benet termination.
3
Although most eorts devoted to the eects of UI on labor markets have concentrated
on the duration of unemployment, early attempts to capture the impact of UI on the labor
markets seem to have focused on the eects of UI benets on re-employment earnings (see
Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976 or Classen, 1977). To my knowledge, Belzil (1990) is the
rst empirical analysis of the eects of UI on job/employment stability.
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will experience better job matches. Assuming that better job matches are
less likely to dissolve, accepted job durations should be sensitive to UI benet
duration. I refer to this eect as the \Matching" hypothesis. The Matching
hypothesis is a type of structural state/duration dependence which implies
a negative correlation between unemployment durations and subsequent job
durations.
An alternative explanation for the correlation between UI benet duration
and subsequent job duration is the \Adverse Selection" hypothesis. Adverse
selection can arise from unobserved characteristics of individuals (unobserved
heterogeneity) and is commonly believed to result in a negative correlation
between unemployment duration and subsequent job durations. That is,
some individuals may have attributes that make them less attractive to em-
ployers but which are not observed by the econometrician. These individuals
are more likely to have longer unemployment spells and shorter subsequent
job durations. If one fails to control for this type of unobserved heterogene-
ity, there is a danger of \spurious state dependence" that could result in the
nding that longer unemployment durations imply shorter subsequent job
durations. In this paper I attempt to control for unobserved heterogeneity
in order to avoid making spurious inferences about the relationship between
unemployment duration and subsequent job duration. By conditioning on a
person's unobserved type, I can assess whether there is indeed a structural
relationship between unemployment duration and subsequent job duration
or only a spurious one. Given data on both unemployment duration and job
duration and information on benet duration, identifying the \Matching"
eect from pure unobserved heterogeneity is therefore relatively simple. For
a set of individuals entitled to the same maximum benet duration (say 0 for
the sake of the argument), the observed correlation between job duration and
unemployment duration can be used to infer the importance of the Adverse
Selection Hypothesis. Conditional on a specic type, individual variations in
benet duration provide information on the marginal eects of benet du-
ration on both unemployment and subsequent job durations (the Matching
hypothesis).
At the outset, I must say that subsequent job duration is only one of
the potential measures of job match quality. However, for reasons discussed
in Section 2, it is the one I focus on. To be consistent with the terminol-
ogy used in the literature, I use the term \maximum benet duration" to
designate the initial benet entitlement period (as measured at the start of
2
the unemployment spell) and the term \potential benet duration" to des-
ignate the number of weeks of benet remaining at a given point in time
(given elapsed unemployment duration). I use a multi-state hazard model to
investigate how the subsequent job hazard function is related to unemploy-
ment duration as well as unemployment benet duration. The model has 2
states (unemployment duration and accepted job duration). The empirical
work is carried on Canadian data which come from administrative les of the
Canadian UI program.
4
More details are found in Section 3 and Section 4.
The results indicate that both hypotheses contribute to explain the ob-
served correlation between unemployment duration and accepted job dura-
tion, although the Matching eect appears much weaker than the sorting
eect explained by bi-variate unobserved heterogeneity. The Matching eec-
t seems to exist only within a short period before benet termination. In
particular, the escape rate out of unemployment seems to increase signi-
cantly within 5 weeks of benet termination and new jobs accepted within
this 5 week period seem to have a higher dissolution rate. At the same time,
and after controlling for individual variations in benet duration, there is a
strong negative correlation between unobserved heterogeneity aecting un-
employment duration and unobserved heterogeneity aecting subsequent job
duration. As the Matching eect seems present only shortly before benet
termination, very few individuals would be aected by a counterfactual in-
crease in benet duration. The results of various simulations indicate that
increasing the maximum benet duration by one week would raise expected
unemployment duration by 1.0 to 1.5 days but raise expected job duration
by only 0.5 to 0.8 days.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section (Section 2), I
present some theoretical arguments which will be used as guidelines for the
econometric model. In Section 3, I present the Canadian UI system. In Sec-
tion 4, I describe the data and discuss the sampling method. The econometric
specication is discussed in Section 5 while the results are in Section 6. In
Section 7, I simulate the eects of an increase in benet duration on average
unemployment duration and average accepted job duration. The conclusion
is in Section 8.
4
The administrative les of the Canadian UI program are now maintained by Human
Resources Development Canada.
3
2 Job Search Theory and the Matching Ef-
fect of UI
The empirical analysis presented in this paper is based on the idea that non-
stationary (decreasing) reservation wages create an identiable dependence
between completed duration, re-employment wages and subsequent job du-
ration. In this section, I illustrate this idea using a simple job search model.
The model is used as a guideline for the specication of the empirical model.
The theoretical framework is as follows. Initially; a group of homogenous
workers are laid o and search for a new job while unemployed. Elapsed
unemployment duration is denoted 
u
. They search for wages from a known
(stationary) distribution function, F (w) .The wage (w) is understood to be
the sum of a monetary payment and a non-monetary component which could
represent job quality. All individuals are entitled to UI benet for a nite pe-
riod (denoted T ). Current benet entitlement, given elapsed unemployment
duration, b(
u
), is described as follows:
b(
u
) =
~
b when 
u
 T
b(
u
) = 0 when 
u
> T
Although it would be straightforward to introduce an exogenous layo prob-
ability without changing the results, I assume that they are no layos. While
unemployed, individuals receive at most one oer per period with probability

u
. When employed, the oer probability is 
e
: With a nite benet period,
it is easy to show that the value of unemployed search, V
u
(b(
u
)); decreases
monotonically until T and remains constant beyond T .
5
It is understood that
V
u
(b(
u
)) represents the value of continuing search taking into account that
search is possible upon re-employment. The value of accepting employment,
at wage w, is denoted V
e
(w): Clearly, V
e
(w) is stationary and the escape rate
out of unemployment, 
u
(
u
); is given by

u
(
u
) = 
u
 f1  F (w


u
)g
where w


u
is the unemployed reservation wage. This reservation wage, w


u
;
is dened as
5
For more details, see Devine and Kiefer (1991).
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Ve
(w


u
) = V
u
(b(
u
))
and it is easy to show that w


u
decreases monotonically until benet termi-
nation.
Given knowledge of 
u
(
u
); it is easy to recover the unemployment dura-
tion density g(
u
): That is
g(
u
) =
d(1  exp( 
R

u
0

u
(s)ds)
d
u
The escape rate out of the accepted job, 
e
(w
a
); is independent of job
tenure, 
e
; but depends on the accepted wage, w
a
; and is simply

e
(w
a
) = 
e
 f1  F (w
a
)g
As the re-employment wage depends on realized unemployment duration
through the reservation wage, the mean accepted wage may be expressed as
follows
E(w
a
) =
1
Z
0
"
Z
1
w


u
(
f(w)
1  F (w


u
)
wdw
)#
 g(
u
)d
u
(1)
where f(:) is the density of wage oers.
Equation 2.1 illustrates how re-employment wages depend on unemploy-
ment duration through the reservation wage. In order to illustrate the Match-
ing eect, it is convenient to look at the post-unemployment job duration
survivor function conditional on unemployment (realized) duration. It is
dened as
Pr(
e
  j 
u
) = S(
e
j 
u
)
Because both V
e
(W ) and 
e
(w
a
) are independent from job tenure, the job
duration survivor function is easy to derive. Bearing in mind that the dis-
tribution of observed wages depends on unemployment duration through the
reservation wage, the conditional survivor function, S(
e
j 
u
), is the expected
survivor function, ES(
e
j w); that is
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Pr(
e
  j 
u
) = S(
e
j 
u
) = E
w
a
S(
e
j w
a
) =
Z
1
w


u
exp( 
e
 
e
(s))
(
f(s)
1  F (w


u
)
)
ds (2)
While (2.1) establishes the negative relationship between unemployment
duration and re-employment wages, (2.2) illustrates that declining reserva-
tion wages create a negative relationship between unemployment and subse-
quent job duration. Altogether, (2.1) and (2.2) illustrate the Matching eect
of UI. As intuitive as it is, the matching eect of UI may turn out to be
much weaker than what one would normally expect. In reality, UI is known
to suer from potential moral hazard problems. If a signicant fraction of
the unemployed use UI to nance household activities (including leisure),
or search less intensively when entitled to more generous benets, changes
in the escape rate out of unemployment may be explained by changes in
search intensity and it is not altogether clear that a matching eect of UI
would prevail at all possible levels of unemployment duration. As well, and
as mentioned above, Adverse Selection could also cause a spurious negative
correlation between unemployment duration and subsequent job duration.
For instance, if those individuals who have a low search intensity are also
those who have a high propensity to quit their subsequent job, the negative
correlation between unemployment and job duration would exist indepen-
dently of the Matching eect. The need for a exible estimation method,
in which the true eect of benet duration can be separated from Adverse
Selection, is therefore quite obvious.
As is usually the case in applied econometrics, the investigator is faced
with the option of estimating a fully structural version of the model or a
reduced-form version. In the present case, it seems natural to model job
match quality using data on accepted job duration and focus on a reduced-
form version of the model. First, modeling job and unemployment duration
(as opposed to a fully specied structural model) will allow us to avoid mak-
ing strong parametric assumptions about the key parameters of the model,
such as the wage distribution. Second, as in most administrative data sets,
re-employment wages are not fully reliable and are truncated beyond a cer-
tain level. Finally, modeling job and unemployment durations exibly will
avoid imposing smooth unemployment exit rates. Indeed, the sudden in-
crease in the escape rate out of unemployment (usually present in US and in
6
Canadian data) is diÆcult to capture in a structural dynamic programming
model based on the rational expectation hypothesis. For all these reasons, I
focus on the reduced-form version of the model and use the duration of the
subsequent job as a measure of job match quality.
3 The Canadian Unemployment Insurance Sys-
tem
The econometric model is estimated from a panel of Canadian labor force
participants which is extracted from the Longitudinal Labor Force File of
Employment and Immigration Canada. In what follows, I provide a brief
discussion of the Canadian UI system. The Canadian Unemployment Insur-
ance system (now called Employment Insurance) was established in 1940. As
most UI systems in western countries, its fund is nanced by premia collected
from employers and employees. After having remained intact between 1940
and 1971, Canada's UI system was changed substantially in 1971. The in-
crease in coverage and in the benet rate, which took place in 1971-72, were
substantial. At the same time, the maximum benet period was extended
and the minimum period of employment required to qualify for benets was
reduced. Although the 1971-72 changes were partially reversed by changes
made between 1977 and 1979 (small reduction in the replacement ratio and
in the maximum benet duration, the Canadian UI system remained quite
generous (compared to most US states) over the period of the current anal-
ysis.
As in many countries, the rules determining benet duration in Canada
are set by the government through a formula that depends on individual
previous labor market history. Basically, those individuals who have worked
more than a minimum number of weeks (10 to 14 weeks depending on the
regional unemployment rate) can qualify for unemployment benet. Unlike
many US states, Canadian workers who quit their jobs are eligible for UI
compensation. During the period covered by the data, those who quit their
job could have been penalized for a period of 6 weeks. While the exogeneity
of the maximum benet period for job quitters can be questioned seriously,
those individuals who have been laid o cannot inuence the length of the
benet period once unemployed. As a consequence, it is reasonable to as-
7
sume that, for those who have been laid o, maximum benet duration is
exogenous. Indeed, this is a standard assumption in the literature.
The analysis presented in this paper is based on a sample of young males
who have experienced a layo between January 1976 and February 1978.
Over this period, the average benet period was slightly decreased after
changes to the UI regulations. This change took place in September 1977.
In the sample used in this study, the dierence in maximum benet dura-
tion between those who have experienced job separation before September
77 and those after is around 3 weeks.
6
For all those individuals who have
experienced a layo in between January 1976 and February 1978, the ben-
et rate has however remained constant at 66% of insurable earnings. The
maximum insurable earnings are typically adjusted yearly to reect changes
in the average industrial salary. Over the sample period, individuals had to
work between 10 to 14 weeks in order to qualify for benet (depending on the
regional rate of unemployment). The potential benet duration is calculated
from the number of weeks of employment over the 52 week period and the
local rate of unemployment at the time. Except for those working in the
shing industry (excluded in this study), there are no variations in UI rules
according to industry.
4 The Data
In this section, I describe the original data set and then explain the sam-
pling method. The data are constructed as an event history data set and
covers a period going from January 1972 until December 1984. It contain
several pieces of information about employment and unemployment spells of
a random sample of Canadian labor force participants. The data are actually
based on a merge of several administrative les such as Records of Employ-
ment (ROE) and the Unemployment Insurance administrative les and they
enable the researcher to recreate the sequence of labor market states occu-
pied by a given individual. As is usually the case with administrative data,
information on insured spells of unemployment (such as benet durations
and the weekly benet level) are relatively accurate. However, the data are
much less reliable when it comes to evaluating the labor market status of
6
For an indepth analysis of the eects of the changes in legislation on both the duration
and the incidence of unemployment, see Belzil (1995).
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those unemployed for a relatively long period, especially those unemployed
beyond benet termination.
The Records of Employment (ROE) identify the reason for separation
and provide information about job tenure, age, experience and industry. In
Canada, rms are legally required to issue a ROE for every job separation
that takes place. The measure of experience available is the total number
of weeks of employment from 1972 until 1984. It is therefore reliable for
younger workers. The Unemployment Insurance le, along with some partial
income tax records le, give information about potential benet duration
for the unemployed, weekly insurable earnings, unemployment duration, UI
benet level and the number of weeks of benet entitlement left when a new
job is accepted. The employer code available is used to identify individuals
who have been laid o and returned with the same employer subsequently.
The key UI variables are dened as follows;
 Initial (maximum) Benet Duration: The maximum number of
weeks of UI benets that an individual can draw as recorded in the
Unemployment Insurance File by the date of the formal application. It
is calculated based on the number of weeks worked during the previous
year, up to a certain maximum (around 45) which may depend itself
on the local rate of unemployment. When an individual experiences
a subsequent spell (under the same claim), initial benet duration is
reduced by the number of weeks used during the previous spell. Given
the legislative changes and individual dierences in previous employ-
ment and unemployment, there is substantial sample variation in initial
entitlement at the beginning of a spell. For a few individuals in the
sample, the maximum benet duration is indeed 0 week.
7
This is read-
ily seen in the table reserved for summary statistics (Table 1). The
mean initial benet duration is 33 weeks but the standard deviation is
14 weeks.
 Potential benet duration: The dierence between maximum ben-
et duration and elapsed unemployment duration. When elapsed du-
ration exceeds maximum benet duration, potential benet duration is
set to 0.
7
For more details, see Ham and Rea (1987).
9
 Benet Level: The weekly benets (measured in Canadian dollars)
calculated from information on weekly insurable earnings.
4.1 Sampling Method
The data set used in this paper contains 2610 individual records of labor
market histories for young males who have suered a job separation between
January 1976 and February 1978. Each individual was between 18 and 25 at
the time of the job separation and was followed until 1984 through adminis-
trative records. Consequently, the number of spells attached to each records
varies considerably across individuals.
8
Out of these 2610 records, 1910 are
coded as layos while 700 individuals quit to become unemployed.
As a rst step, I retain the 1910 individuals who have experienced a layo.
As a second step, I exclude the 1001 cases where unemployment was followed
by a job with the previous employer as well as the 700 individuals quo quit
their job. This is because those individuals who returned to their previous
employer are most likely to be on temporary layos and are likely to have a
distinct search behavior from those who were displaced permanently. Those
who quit their job are more likely to have a weaker attachment to the labor
market.
9
The resulting sample contains 909 individuals who have experienced
an involuntary job separation. Most of these individuals (889 cases) have
found a new job with a dierent employer while 20 of them have been lost
by the UI authorities which means that I observe no subsequent job duration
for these individuals. Given that reported unemployment duration is likely
to be unreliable for these individuals, I censor unemployment duration at
50 weeks. In terms of the subsequent jobs, these 909 individual records are
classied as followed;
 464 subsequent job durations which were later terminated by a layo
 289 subsequent job durations terminated by a quit.
8
Although the original le contains information on multiple unemployment and em-
ployment spells, for the current study, I only had access to a single unemployment and
job spell per individual.
9
Belzil (1995) has performed a separate analysis of those who are on temporary layos
and found that the eect of UI benet on unemployment duration and re-employment
duration (unemployment incidence) diered substantially from the eects obtained for
those individuals who accepted a new job.
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 136 subsequent job spells still in progress as of 1984
 20 cases where the unemployment spell is the last recorded state.
With administrative data, it is quite diÆcult to collect information on in-
dividuals who become non-participants. Among all individuals experiencing
a layo during this period (not only young workers), only 3.7% have actually
left the accepted job to leave the labor force. However, as this information
is actually estimated from the existence of subsequent employment record-
s, this number can only be viewed as an estimate. As I look only at young
males whom are well known to have a high turnover rate, only 15% (136/909)
are still employed with same employer at the end of 1984. To summarize,
each individual contributes, at most, one unemployment duration-accepted
job duration sequence. Some summary statistics are found in Table1.
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Table 1
Some Sample Statistics
Variable Mean Stand. Dev.
Experience (weeks) 127 61
Previous Earnings (1977 dollars) 240 120
Duration of unemployment (weeks) 14 18
Maximum Benet Period (weeks) 33 14
Potential Benet period (at re-employment) 6 3
Unemployment Benets ( 1977 dollars) 122 30
Previous Job Duration (weeks) 22 29
Accepted Earnings (current dollars) 223 102
Duration of Accepted job (weeks) 35 65
% in Primary Sector 7.1 -
% in Construction 7.2 -
% in Manufacturing 18.7 -
% in Transportation 11.0 -
% in Trade 13.6 -
% in Finance 11.2 -
% in Services 15.4 -
% in Administration 15.3 -
Notes:
 Earnings and unemployment benets are measured in 1977 Canadian
dollars.
 For the period over which job separation took place, the maximum
benet level was around 145$ per week.
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5 Econometric Specication: Disentangling
True State Dependence from Spurious S-
tate Dependence
The analysis presented in this paper is based on a multi-state duration mod-
el which is used to estimate the eects of unemployment insurance benet
duration on subsequent job match quality (subsequent job duration). Job
duration is dened as the waiting time until the subsequent job (following a
spell of unemployment) is terminated voluntarily. The model has the follow-
ing features;
 The distribution of subsequent job duration depends on completed un-
employment duration (contiguous duration dependence) and the de-
pendence is specied such that I can distinguish between a potential
benet duration eect and a general unemployment duration eect.
 The escape rate out of unemployment depends on the potential (re-
maining) benet period (a time-varying co-variate).
 Unemployment duration and accepted job duration are stochastically
related through unobserved heterogeneity.
5.1 Modeling the Hazard Functions
In order to estimate the eect of benet duration on subsequent job duration
I have to model two separate durations; unemployment duration and sub-
sequent job duration. Because semi-parametric estimations of each hazard
function would require the estimation of a very large number of parameters
on top of the already large number of regression parameters which I have
to estimate, I restrict myself to a parametric representation of the baseline
hazard functions. I however estimate the distribution of the unobserved het-
erogeneity terms using a exible method.
As a starting point, I model the hazard function for the duration of un-
employment. This is the hazard function given maximum benet duration
t

. At this stage, it is useful to discuss duration dependence. Duration
dependence can arise because the data generating process implies duration
dependence or because a co-variate is itself changing with elapsed duration.
13
Simultaneously, spurious duration dependence in unemployment can also be
caused by unobserved (neglected) heterogeneity. The specication of a haz-
ard function where potential benet duration changes every week will capture
duration dependence in the search behavior of the unemployed caused by UI
benet exhaustion. Other duration eects will typically be captured in the
baseline hazard.
I specify the unemployment hazard function as proportional hazards mod-
el with a time varying covariate (potential benet duration) model and un-
observed heterogeneity and a Weibull (rather than non-parametric) baseline
hazard.
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Denoting unemployment duration (in continuous time) by 
u
, let-
ting Z
u
denote the set of time-invariant covariates and X(
u
) the potential
benet duration at a given point in time, it is easy to see that
Pr(
u
 t
u
+1 j 
u
 t
u
) = expf exp(Z
u
'
u
+Æ(X(t
u
))X(t
u
)+log "
u
+h

0
(t
u
; ))g
(3)
where h

0
(t
u
; ) = log((t
u
+ 1)

  t

u
) and  is a parameter to be estimated.
X(t
u
) is the dierence between maximum benet duration (t

) minus elapsed
unemployment duration in discrete time (t
u
); that is
X(t
u
) = Max(t

  t
u
; 0)
The marginal eect of potential benet duration on the unemployment haz-
ard, Æ(X(t
u
)), is discussed in more details below. I assume that UI benet
entitlement changes between intervals (from one week to another) but re-
mains constant within each interval (between t
u
and t
u
+ 1): The vector of
time invariant regressors (Z
u
) includes age (as measured at the start of the
unemployment spell), experience and industrial classication.
For observations censored at t
u
,
Pr(
u
 t
u
) =
t
u
 1
Y
s=1
exp( exp(Z
u
'
u
+ Æ(X(s)) X(s)+ log "
u
+h

0
(s; ))) (4)
10
Note that most theoretical models based on job search or job matching arguments pre-
dict that the job hazard rates are declining with tenure. Empirical evidence also suggests
that job exit rates are declining with tenure (see Devine and Kiefer, 1991, for a survey).
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In the sample which I analyzed, the average potential benet period is
around 30 weeks while the maximum is 45 (for 7 individuals). Because UI
oÆcials report that recorded unemployment duration is likely to be inaccu-
rate for those who have very long durations, I censor every duration at 50
weeks.
In order to take into account that the eect of a decrease in one week of
benet entitlement may change as benet termination approaches, I estimate
a more general specication where the eects of potential benet period is
allowed to vary over the duration of unemployment. This is accomplished
using the following set of variables; X(t
u
); X
20 29
, X
10 19
; X
6 9
and X
1 5
:
These variables are dened as follows;
X
20 29
= X(t
u
) if X(t
u
)  29 and 0 if not
X
10 19
= X(t
u
) if X(t
u
)  19 and 0 if not
X
6 9
= X(t
u
) if X(t
u
)  9 and 0 if not
X
1 5
= X(t
u
) if X(t
u
)  5 and 0 if not
Altogether, these variables measure the remaining weeks of UI benet at each
point in the unemployment spell. With more than 29 weeks remaining, only
potential benet duration (X(t
u
)) takes non-zero values. When the number
of weeks of UI benet remaining lies between 20 and 29, both X(t
u
) and
X
20 29
take non-zero values. As a similar argument is applied to the remain-
ing segments (1 to 5 and 6-9), it follows that the marginal eect of a week
of UI benet is captured by summing the coeÆcients appropriately. As the
potential benet period decreases with elapsed unemployment duration, the
marginal eect of an additional week of benet represents the counterfactual
eect of moving backward in time, away from benet termination. It is given
by
 Æ when the current entitlement is between 30 and 50 weeks,
 Æ + Æ
20 29
when the current entitlement is between 20 and 29,
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 Æ + Æ
20 29
+ Æ
10 19
when the current entitlement is between 10 and 19
weeks,
 Æ + Æ
20 29
+ Æ
10 19
+ Æ
6 9
when the current entitlement is between 6
and 9 weeks
 Æ + Æ
20 29
+ Æ
10 19
+ Æ
6 9
+ Æ
0 5
within 5 weeks of benet termination.
As an example, if the sum of all the coeÆcients from Æ+ Æ
20 29
+ Æ
10 19
+
Æ
6 9
+ Æ
0 5
is negative, this indicates that, within 5 weeks from benet ter-
mination, the hazard decreases with each additional week of potential (re-
maining) benet duration or, in other words, that the hazard increases as
the individual approaches benet termination. The eect of losing a week of
benet is therefore simply the opposite of the appropriate sum of the spline
parameter estimates.
Finally, the last component of the model is subsequent job duration. As
stated earlier, accepted job duration is understood as the waiting time until
the individual quits the accepted job and is meant to measure the quality of
the job match. Accepted job spells terminated by reasons other than a quit
are considered as censored accepted job durations. This simply means that a
job terminated by layo was still acceptable to the worker. Given my objec-
tive to estimate the eects of UI benet duration on accepted job duration,
I must allow the accepted job hazard to depend on completed unemploy-
ment duration as well as a measure of benet termination. I simply model
accepted job duration using a proportional hazard with a Weibull baseline
distribution. As I do with unemployment duration, I assume that recorded
job duration takes discrete values which are generated from a continuous
random variable, 
j
; which hazard function is given by
h
j
(
j
j t
u
; "
j
) = exp(Z
0
j

j
+ 
0
 t
u
+ 
1
 t
u;50
+  X(t
u
) + log "
j
)  
 1
j
(5)
where Z
j
is a vector of regressor including experience, age and industrial
classication dummies. The eect of unemployment duration is measured by
t
u
(when duration is below or equal to 50) and t
u;50
(a binary variable equal
to 1 for those unemployed more than 50 weeks) while X(t
u
) is the number of
weeks of benet left when the individual left unemployment to accept a new
job. For instance, X(t
u
) is 0 for all those who found a job following benet
termination.
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In order to be more exible, I can also allow the eect of benet dura-
tion left to vary over the total benet duration period and make use of the
variables X(.), X
20 29
, X
10 19
; X
6 9
and X
1 5
in order to obtain the ex-post
eect of potential benet duration on accepted job duration. The associat-
ed parameters are ; 
20 29
; 
10 19
; 
6 9
and 
0 5
: As for the unemployment
hazards, the eects of potential benet duration on accepted job hazards is
measured by the sum of the appropriate coeÆcients.
5.2 Constructing the Likelihood Function
I construct the likelihood function as if exact spell lengths are unknown
but I assume that the interval during which failure time takes place are
known. The likelihood function can easily be constructed. If we assume
that conditional on unobserved heterogeneity, unemployment duration and
accepted job duration are independent, the likelihood function is simply the
product of two individual densities. Noting that the number of accepted job
spells (M) is smaller than the number of unemployment spells (N), the 2
components are as follows
 Unemployment Duration
L
u
(t
u
j t

; "
u
) =
N
Y
i=1
[1  exp( exp(Z
0
u

u
+ ÆX(t
ui
) + log "
u
+ h

0
(t
ui
; )))]
c
u
i
"
t
ui
 1
Y
s=1
exp( exp(Z
0
u

u
+ ÆX(s) + log "
u
+ h

0
(s; )))
#
The censoring indicator, c
u
i
; equals 1 if a spell is completed (between t
ui
and
t
ui
+ 1) and 0 if right censored.
 Accepted Job Duration
L
j
(t
ji
j t

; t
u
; "
j
) =
M
Y
i=1
h
1  exp( exp(Z
0
j

j
+ 
0
:t
u
+ 
1
:t
u;50
+ :X(t
u
) + log "
j
+ h

0
(t
ji
; )))
i
c
j
i
:
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t
ji
 1
Y
s=1
exp( exp(Z
0
j

j
+ 
0
:t
u
+ 
1
:t
u;50
+ :X(t
u
) + log "
j
+ h

0
(s; )))
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where c
j
i
is the censoring indicator for accepted job duration and is dened
similarly as c
u
i
: Given these denitions, the conditional likelihood function,
L(t
ui
; t
ji
j t
i
; "
u
; "
j
); is simply
L(t
u
; t
j
j "
u
; "
j
; t

) = L
u
(t
u
j "
u
; t

):L
j
(t
j
j t

; t
u
; "
j
) (6)
5.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity
Estimation of the model by likelihood techniques requires that the individual
unobserved heterogeneity terms be integrated out. In the paper, I consider
the case where "
u
and "
j
follow a bi-variate discrete distribution and where
both "
u
and "
j
have two points of support. The distribution is summarized as
follows; Pr("
u
= "
u
1
; "
j
= "
j
1
) = p
1
; Pr("
u
= "
u
2
; "
j
= "
j
1
) = p
2
, Pr("
u
= "
u
1
; "
j
=
"
j
2
) = p
3
and Pr("
u
= "
u
2
; "
j
= "
j
2
) = p
4
for "
u
1
> "
u
2
and "
j
1
> "
j
2
: In this case,
4 points of support and three free probabilities need to be estimated: The
likelihood functions to be maximized is an average of 5.4 over all possible
combinations of unobserved heterogeneity. In order to implement the model,
I dene the population proportions as logistic transforms.
11
The model is
estimated with the Maximum Likelihood application in Gaussi 3.2.26 on a
Pentium 200. The log likelihood function is maximized using the BFGS and
the BHHH algorithms.
6 Empirical Results
In this section, the empirical results are presented. The main parameter
estimates and the marginal eects of approaching benet termination are
discussed in Section 6.1 while goodness of t is discussed in Section 6.2.
11
Standard errors for all p's can be obtained using the delta method. It can be shown
that the correlation between "
u
and "
j
can be evaluated by the following expression;
Corr("
u
; "
j
) =
p
1
p
4 
p
2
p
3
p
(p
1
+p
3
)(p
2
+p
4
)(p
1
+p
2
)(p
3
+p
4
)
. It follows that the restriction needed to
impose independence (a correlation of 0) between "
u
and "
j
is simply q
3
= q
1
 q
2
: Testing
for independence (given that "
u
1
6= "
u
2
and "
j
1
6= "
j
2
) can be achieved with a likelihood ratio
statistic which has a 
2
1
distribution under the null hypothesis.
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6.1 The Relationship between Potential Benet Dura-
tion and Subsequent Job Duration
The main parameter estimates are found in Table 2. I present two set of
estimates; those obtained when past earnings are introduced (column 1)
and those obtained when it is omitted (column 2). I do so because previous
earnings are possibly correlated with unobserved heterogeneity.
12
The eect
of previous earnings on the exit rate out of unemployment is found to be
positive (0.38) and indicates that, other things equal, those with higher pre-
unemployment earnings leave unemployment faster.
13
The eect of benet
level is negative (-0.28) and indicates that, all else equal, those receiving
higher level of benets tend to leave unemployment later. Both results are
standard in the literature. The estimate for  (0.93) indicates the presence
of negative duration dependence (the hazard function decreases with elapsed
unemployment duration).
As has been found in the literature, the eect of potential benet duration
(captured in the Æ's) varies with the level of potential benet duration. The
spline estimates are -0.31 (Æ
0 5
), -0.20 (Æ
6 9
), -0.06 (Æ
10 19
), 0.01 (Æ
20 29
)
and -0.03 (Æ). Only Æ
0 5
, Æ
6 9
and Æ
10 19
are signicantly dierent from
0. In order to facilitate the understanding of the spline estimates, I have
summarized the marginal eects of approaching benet exhaustion for all
ranges considered. In order to illustrate the eect of moving closer to benet
termination, the sum of all appropriate parameters is multiplied by -1. These
marginal eects are found in Table 3. There is clear evidence that before 19
weeks from benet termination, potential benet duration has practically no
impact on unemployment hazards. With 10 to19 weeks of benet left, losing
an additional week (approaching benet termination by one week) raises the
hazard by 0.08 while between 6 to 9 weeks, the increase is 0.27. The eect
is particularly strong within 5 weeks from benet termination; the hazard
increases by 0.58 for each additional week.
The exible specication of the eect of benet duration on accepted job
duration (with ; 
20 29
; 
10 19
; 
6 9
and 
0 5
) allows me to compare the
exit rate out of the subsequent job at various levels of potential benet du-
12
The parameter estimates for age, experience and industry dummy regressors can be
found in Belzil (2000).
13
I also use a binary variable for the case where previous earnings are top coded (equal
to the maximum insurable earnings).
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ration left when the new job was accepted. The spline estimates (found in
Table 2) are -0.02 (
0 5
), -0.04(
6 9
), -0.01(
10 19
), 0.00 (
20 29
) and 0.01
(). In general, they are less signicant than the unemployment duration
spline estimates. While only 
0 5
and 
6 9
appear reasonably signican-
t, a likelihood ratio test for the joint signicance of the spline estimates
(
0 5
::.=...
20 29
= 0) is rejected at the 5% level (the p-value is 0.05).
14
The
spline estimates are therefore jointly signicant. Similar to the unemploy-
ment hazards, I have transformed the spline estimates into marginal eects
of approaching benet termination on accepted job hazards. These esti-
mates, also found in Table 3, can be used to investigate the importance of
the Matching eect at various ranges of potential benet duration. Overall,
I nd a pattern relatively similar to the one observed for the unemployment
hazards; the eect of potential benet is positive and stronger around bene-
t termination. However, the parameter estimates are generally much lower
(in absolute values) than the eect of potential benet duration on unem-
ployment hazards. The Matching eect is practically non-existent until the
individual is left with less than 9 weeks of benet duration. Within 6 to 9
weeks of benet termination, every week of benet lost translates into an
increase of 0.0392 in the accepted job hazard (as summarized in Table 3).
Within 5 weeks, the eect is 0.0639. After controlling for benet duration,
the eect of an additional week of unemployment on subsequent job hazard-
s is positive (0.0256) but insignicant. While the evidence in favor of the
Matching eect appears relatively weak, the importance of unobserved het-
erogeneity is well illustrated by the signicance of the correlation estimate.
I nd the correlation between unemployment duration and subsequent job
duration unobserved heterogeneity to be -0.60 and the asymptotic t-ratio is
larger than 10. This should be taken as evidence that those who tend to
experience longer spells of unemployment are also those who tend to expe-
rience shorter job spells. The parameter estimate for (
0
) is positive (0.03)
but insignicant and indicates that, after conditioning on benet duration,
unemployment duration has no signicant eect on subsequent job hazards.
Finally, the scale parameter of the subsequent job hazard function ( = 0:85)
indicates negative duration dependence.
The estimates in column 2 are those obtained when previous earnings are
included. Overall, the results appear unaected by the exclusion of previous
14
The parameter estimates obtained under the null hypothesis are found in Belzil (2000).
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earnings. A decrease in potential benet duration increases the unemploy-
ment hazard by a factor 0.61 between 0 to 5 weeks from benet termination,
by a factor of 0.28 between 6 and 9 weeks, and by 0.08 between 10 and 19
weeks from benet termination. However, benet duration does not seem
to matter really when individuals are more than 19 weeks away from ben-
et termination. As in the model with previous earnings, the estimates of
the eect of potential benet duration on subsequent job hazards indicate
that most of the matching eects of UI benets are located within 10 weeks
from benet exhaustion; the marginal eect is around 0.06 within 5 weeks
from benet termination and 0.03 between 6 and 9 weeks. Beyond 9 weeks,
the spline estimates imply very low marginal eects and, as a consequence,
there is practically no Matching eect. The test for the joint signicance of

1 5
; 
6 9
; 
10 19
and 
20 29
rejects the null hypothesis at 5% and indicates
that there is a signicant matching eect (the p-value is 0.042).
To summarize, I nd some support for a positive eect of unemployment
benet duration on subsequent job match quality. However, the results also
indicate that the eects of benet duration on unemployment hazards and ac-
cepted job hazards are located mostly within 5 weeks of benet termination.
When individuals are more than 10 weeks away from benet exhaustion, po-
tential UI benet duration has virtually no eect on subsequent job duration.
It should also be noted that in the short interval over which I nd a Matching
eect of UI benet duration, job hazards are much less sensitive to benet
termination than unemployment hazards. At the same time, I nd strong
evidence of a negative (and signicant) correlation between unemployment
duration and job duration. There is therefore much support for the Adverse
Selection hypothesis.
6.2 Goodness of Fit
As is commonly done in applied microeconometrics, empirical frequencies
(unemployment and subsequent job durations) can be compared to predicted
frequencies in order to evaluate the relevance of the model. This is particu-
larly important in a framework where the baseline distribution is estimated
using parametric methods. The unemployment duration frequencies are in
Table 4A and the subsequent job duration frequencies are in Table 4B. A
comparison between actual and predicted unemployment duration frequen-
cies indicates that the model ts unemployment duration quite well. This
21
is most likely explained by the exible specication of the eect of benet
duration. While the predicted subsequent duration frequencies appear to be
below actual job duration frequencies at short duration and exceed actual
frequencies at long duration, the goodness of t is still reasonably good.
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Table 2
Parameter Estimates
(1) (2)
Unemp. duration - -
Log Earnings 0.3822 (2.88) -
Benet level (log) -0.2834 (3.01) -0.2935 (2.92)
Duration Dependence () 0.9256 (6.68) 0.9221 (6.58)
Remaining Benet Duration
Æ
(1 5)
-0.3076 (3.01) -0.3325 (2.64)
Æ
(6 9)
-0.1978 (2.27) -0.2032 (2.36)
Æ
(10 19)
-0.0567 (2.02) -0.0612 (1.93)
Æ
(20 29)
0.0126 (1.18) 0.0139 (0.85)
Æ -0.0307 (0.83) -0.0298 (0.56)
Unobs. heterogeneity
"
u
1
0.5387 (2.89) 0.5832 (3.12)
"
u
2
0.3628 (2.28) 0.3394 (2.42)
"
j
1
0.3923 (3.18) 0.3623 (2.90)
"
j
2
0.2638 (2.02) 0.2341 (1.79)
P
1
0.0645 (2.00) 0.0589 (1.83)
P
2
0.3745 (2.57) 0.4005 (3.24)
P
3
0.3834 (3.04) 0.3905 (2.36)
Corr("
u
; "
j
) -0.6020 (10.03) -0.6201 (9.63)
23
Table 2- Continued
(1) (2)
Accepted job duration
Duration Dependence () 0.8471 (4.24) 0.8395 (5.15)
Unemp. Duration (
0
) 0.0256 (1.68) 0.0200 (1.68)
Unemp. Dur
50
(
1
) 0.2015 (1.67) 0.1956 (1.74)
Benet Duration Left

X(1 5)
-0.0247 (1.88) -0.0327 (1.90)

X(6 9)
-0.0393 (1.68) -0.0356 (1.65)

X(10 19)
-0.0067 (1.02) -0.0074 (1.39)

X(20 29)
0.0012 (0.57) 0.0059 (0.95)

X(t
u
)
0.0056 (0.89) 0.0059 (0.78)
Log likelihood -1343.9 -1348.0
Notes:
Asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses.
The p-value for the likelihood ratio test for the null that 
X(1 5)
..=..
X(20 29)
=
0 is 0.0531 in column 1 and 0.042 in column 2. Estimates obtained
under the null hypothesis can be found in Belzil (2000).
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Table 3
The Marginal Eects of Approaching Benet Termination
on Unemployment and Subsequent Job Hazards
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemp. Unemp Sub. Job Sub. Job
Hazards Hazards Hazards Hazards
Prev. Earnings included excluded included excluded
Weeks of
Benet Left
0-5 0.5812 0.6128 0.0639 0.0627
6-9 0.2736 0.2803 0.0392 0.0300
10-19 0.0758 0.0771 -0.0001 -0.0056
20-29 0.0181 0.0159 -0.0068 -0.0118
30-50 0.0307 0.0298 -0.0056 -0.0059
Note: The marginal eects of approaching benet termination, found in col-
umn 1 and column 2, represent the eect of losing an additional week of
potential benet duration on unemployment hazards. The marginal eects
of approaching benet termination, found in column 3 and column 4, repre-
sent the eect of losing an additional week of potential benet duration on
accepted job hazards. Both of them are computed using the appropriate sum
of the spline estimates (the Æ
0
s and the 
0
s).
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Table 4A
Goodness of Fit: Unemployment Duration
(1) (2)
predicted actual
freqencies freqencies
Weeks
1-4 0.43 0.40
5-8 0.15 0.13
9-12 0.07 0.08
13-16 0.05 0.06
17-20 0.03 0.05
21-24 0.03 0.04
25-28 0.02 0.02
29-more 0.20 0.12
Table 4B
Goodness of Fit: Subsequent Job Duration
(1) (2)
predicted actual
frequencies frequencies
Weeks
1- 10 0.16 0.19
11-20 0.13 0.17
21-30 0.15 0.15
31-40 0.09 0.08
41-50 0.05 0.06
51-60 0.05 0.04
61-70 0.05 0.03
71-more 0.32 0.28
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7 The Eects of Benet Duration on Unem-
ployment and Accepted Job Durations: Some
Simulations
At this stage, it seems natural to investigate the eects of increasing maxi-
mum benet duration. I have performed simulations for two dierent types
of individual; one entitled to 25 weeks and one entitled to 45 weeks. In
both cases, I have computed the increase in mean unemployment duration
and mean accepted job duration following an increase of 1 week in maxi-
mum benet duration. I have performed those simulations for both model
specications reported in the paper.
Overall, the results indicate that the unemployment duration elasticity
ranges from 0.15 and 0.20. In terms of weeks, these estimates indicate that
increasing potential benet duration by an additional week will increase mean
unemployment duration by 1.5 to 1.1 days
15
. The eects of benet duration
on accepted job durations are smaller. The elasticities range from 0.10 to
0.13. Increasing potential benet duration by 1 week will increase mean job
duration by less than 1 day; the increase in job duration ranges from 0.5 to
0.8 days. Although the eect of an increase in benet duration might appear
weak, one should bear in mind that the parameter estimates indicate that
the matching eect is located mostly at the end of the benet period. As
a consequence, for all those leaving unemployment with a potential benet
duration superior to 5 weeks, an increase in benet duration has virtually no
impact on the subsequent job hazard rate. To summarize, although both the
unemployment duration and accepted job duration eects of an increase in
benet duration are small, the increase in unemployment duration is higher
than the increase in accepted job duration. The negative eects of benet
duration therefore tend to dominate the positive eects.
16
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The eects of benet duration on unemployment duration appear consistent with
simulation results reported by various authors. For instance, Ham and Rea (1987) report
that an increase of 1 week in benet duration increases unemployment duration by 0.16
to 0.20 week. For a review, see Devine and Kiefer (1991). As far as I know, the eect of
benet duration on job duration cannot be compared to any study.
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All the results reported previously are based on the hypothesis that the matching
eects of UI benets are measured by the waiting time until an individual will quit the
post unemployment job. In order to check the robustness of the results to the denition of
a job termination , I have extended the analysis to the case where accepted job duration
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Table 6
Simulating the Eects of an Increase in Benet Duration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
%Unemp:Duration
%Benefit:Duration
%Job:Duration
%Benefit:Duration
Ben. dur 25 weeks 45 weeks 25 weeks 45 weeks
Table 3, col 1 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.11
Table 3, col 2 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.10
Note: Simulations have been computed at the maximum benet duration
of 25 weeks and 45 weeks.
8 Conclusion
It is generally considered that UI benet generosity induces those who have
lost their job to remain unemployed for longer periods. The eects of UI bene-
t generosity on the quality of post-unemployment labor market adjustments
are however not as clear. In this paper, I have tried to measure the eects
of potential UI benet duration on the quality of subsequent job matches
and investigated whether the correlation between completed unemployment
duration and subsequent job duration is explained by Job Matching or by
Adverse Selection.
Overall, I nd the Job Matching eect to be weak. While there is a
structural eect of benet duration taking place shortly before benet ter-
mination, the negative correlation between unemployment and job duration
is dened as the waiting time until the accepted job is terminated either by a layo or a
quit. This can be justied by the fact that the distinction between quits and layos can
sometimes be insignicant. Despite the fact that accepted job duration is re-dened, the
changes in the estimates of benet duration on the accepted job duration hazard function
are quite marginal. The resulting elasticities (ranging between 0.08 and 0.11) indicate
that an increase of 1 week in benet duration will increase accepted job duration by 0.4
to 0.8 day. More details can be found in Belzil (2000).
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is mostly explained by Adverse Selection. As a consequence, raising unem-
ployment benet duration will only have a marginal eect on subsequent
job duration. The results of various simulations indicate that increasing the
maximum benet duration by one week will raise expected unemployment
duration by 1.0 to 1.5 days but expected job duration by 0.5 to 0.9 days only.
It is well known that an increase in unemployment hazards can be ex-
plained by an increase in search eort, a decrease in reservation wages or by
implicit recall arrangements between workers and rms. Since workers re-
turning to the same employer are eliminated from the sample, the larger sen-
sitivity of unemployment hazards to benet termination, when compared to
subsequent job hazards, seems to indicate that reservation wages do not drop
substantially. Perhaps, the increase in unemployment hazards is explained
mostly by an increase in search eort. At the same time, the strong negative
correlation between unemployment duration heterogeneity and accepted job
duration heterogeneity is harder to explain. As unobserved heterogeneity is
meant to capture the eects of all omitted characteristics on unemployment
and job duration outcomes, giving a structural interpretation to the negative
correlation (after controlling for benet duration) can be seen as hazardous.
As stated before, Adverse Selection is one of the potential interpretation of
the strong negative correlation between unemployment duration and subse-
quent job duration. If individuals, who have a strong taste for leisure or
household production, tend to exhaust their benets and accept jobs that
last long enough to re-qualify for UI benets, the data would certainly ex-
hibit negative correlation between unemployment job duration and accepted
job duration. As search eort is inherently unobservable, this type of sorting
eect is probably unavoidable. This suggests an avenue for future research.
Structural job search models, which are estimated from micro-data and based
on the maintained hypothesis that individuals start searching once they have
lost their job, should perhaps be modied to take into account that household
production (or leisure) is a substitute to job search activities.
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